Syria and the Changing Global Calculus By Joshua Muravchik

Iran and Russia have suffered serious setbacks over the past year, but grave dangers remain.

It was not quite as quick as the Six Day War, nor is it likely to be as consequential as the “Ten Days that Shook the World,” when Lenin’s Bolsheviks seized power in Russia. But it took only twelve days from the moment an Islamist band struck out from their redoubt in Idlib until they overran the presidential palace in Damascus, chasing President Bashar al-Assad into exile. And if it proves to be less momentous than the birth of communism in 1917, it has still shaken the Middle East, with reverberations that are likely to be felt around the globe.

Initially, Russia and Iran had acted to defend the regime of President Assad. A reported 4,000 Iranian Revolutionary Guards were stationed in Syria, boosted by a contingent of Lebanese Hezbollah fighters. As the rebels advanced, Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi flew to Baghdad, seeking to add forces from the Shi’ite-dominated government there. But when he was turned down, Iran ordered the IRGC to hasten home from Syria, and Hezbollah dispatched some officers from Lebanon to bring its fighters home. Russia, whose critical military support of Assad had always consisted primarily of airpower, flew a few sorties against the rebels in the first days of their campaign. These claimed some lives, but they didn’t slow the rebel advance, and the airstrikes soon petered out.

Humiliated by the sudden fall of their client, Moscow and Tehran issued almost identical explanations. One Russian analyst said of Assad’s forces: “It’s not possible to help an army that’s running.” Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said: “Voluntary forces from elsewhere can only fight alongside the army of that country. If the local army shows weakness, the [outsiders] cannot do anything.” But Russia and Iran had come to Syria in the first place because its army was hardly fighting.

That was during the previous decade. In 2011, the year of the “Arab Spring,” peaceful protests began in Syria as in many nearby countries. The regime sought to repress them violently, and soldiers began to defect. Some of the deserters reappeared as armed escorts defending the protest marches. As violence mounted, nonviolent protests gave way to full-scale civil war. A rebel force was formed largely from defectors, calling itself the Free Syrian Army. Sunni Arab states, Turkey, and Western countries provided the rebels with arms and training. On the other side, Russia, Iran, and Iran’s instrument, Hezbollah, rallied to support the regime. But Syrian soldiers continued to defect or perform desultorily and lost ground.